Paul Manafort – Mueller Report Volume 1
Relevant Persons:
“Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman, from March to August 2016. Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort’s office in Kiev and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee, to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign” (p. 129).
Manafort Pt. 2 (p. 131-141)
Summary:
Manafort’s had ties with a Russian oligarch, Oleg Deripaska, whose goals aligned with Putin’s government. He also had ties with a Ukrainian oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, who hired Manafort to help Viktor Yanukovych win the presidency in Ukraine in 2010. Yanukovych and his political party were aligned with Russia and Yanukovych fled to Russia in 2014 during the protests and unrest in Ukraine.
He also worked with Konstantin Kilimnik, who had connections to Russian intelligence, Russian oligarchs, and Ukrainian oligarchs. Manafort sent Kilimnik internal polling data, the Campaign’s messaging, and also discussed with him many things, such as the 2016 “battleground” states. In one of his meetings with Kilimnik, they also discussed the possibility of creating an autonomous republic in eastern Ukraine that Russia would use to control eastern Ukraine.
Specific passages regarding this from Mueller Report are shown below:
“In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin. A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on “the Putin Government.” Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as “political risk insurance,” and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests. Manafort’s company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well” (131).
“In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P. (“Pericles”), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe. Deripaska was the sole investor. Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska. In particular, when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort’s business relationship with Deripaska had “dried up.” According to Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute. As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation” (131-132).
“Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant. In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions, a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests” (132).
“Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian “spy.” The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence. Several pieces of the Office ‘s evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through court authorized search warrants-support that assessment” (133).
“Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could share it with Ukrainian oligarchs. Gates understood that the information would also be shared with Deripaska. Gates reported to the Office that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information, but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafort ‘s work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trump Campaign ended. Gates said that Manafort ‘s instruction included sending internal polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio. Fabrizio had worked with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in accordance with Manafort’s instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp; Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. Gates further told the Office that, after Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and that the data he sent was more publicly available information and less internal data” (136).
“Gate’s account about polling data is consistent with multiple emails that Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016. Those emails references “internal polling,” described the status of the Trump campaign and Manafort’s role in it, and assessed Trump’s prospects for victory. Manafort did not acknowledge instructing Gates to send Kilimnik internal data” (137).
“Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin’s “boss,” a reference to Deripaska, “that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate.” Manafort has alleged to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate. Manafort said he never gave Deripaska a briefing. Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance what ever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere” (137).
“…on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed “about 2 hours” for their meeting “because it is a long caviar story to tell.” …. As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates-who arrived late to the dinner-differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate that at least three principal topics were discussed” (140).
First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas, and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic. That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a “backdoor” means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan. Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik asking Manafort to reconsider the plan after their August 2 meeting. Manafort said that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending-years later-an “urgent” request when Yanukovych needed him. When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email. Manafort ultimately acknowledged Kilimnik also raised the peace plan in January and February 2017 meetings with Manafort.
“Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s plan to win the election. That briefing encompassed the Campaign’s messaging and its internal polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of “battleground” states, which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. Manafort did not refer explicitly to “battleground ” states in his telling of the August 2 discussion” (140).
“Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort’s previous work in the region. Those consisted of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment. After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik” (141).
Analysis:
Manafort’s had worked with pro-Russian oligarchs and others whose goals aligned with Putin’s government. He helped a pro-Russian candidate win the presidency in Ukraine. He was involved in a meeting with a Russian intelligence-connected individual in which a plan to help Russia regain control over Ukraine, and thus undermine the efforts or Ukraine, NATO, and the US, was discussed. This is nothing short of conspiracy.
The fact that he was discussing campaign information with Russians with known ties to Putin’s government means there could have been a connection between Trump and the Russian government. The extent to which he was involved with Russia and the extent of the role Trump played is debated. There is also a possibility that Manafort was not disclosing everything or lying. As Mueller said, “The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort’s electronic communications (in some instances , messages were sent using encryption applications). And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.” The intrigue with Manafort’s involvement is not just what we do know, but what we don’t.